Sunset ride

PRESIDENT MACRON: The first one is to block any nuclear activity of Iran until 2025. This was feasible thanks to the JCPOA. The second is to make sure that, in the long run, there is no nuclear Iranian activity. The third fundamental topic is to be able to put an end to the ballistic activities of Iran in the region. And the fourth one is to generate the conditions for a solution — a political solution to contain Iran in the region — in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq, and in Lebanon. On these topics, I did not change. I constantly said that we needed to find the framework so that, together, and with the powers of the region, and with the Iranian leaders, manage to find a deal. I therefore would like us to commit to that effect in the weeks and months to come. 

PRESIDENT TRUMP: And I think we will have a great shot at doing a much bigger maybe deal, maybe not deal. We’re going to find out, but we’ll know fairly soon. 
..... But there is a chance — and nobody knows what I’m going to do on the 12th, although, Mr. President, you have a pretty good idea — but we’ll see. But we’ll see also, if I do what some people expect, whether or not it will be possible to do a new deal with solid foundations. Because this a deal with decayed foundations. It’s a bad deal. It’s a bad structure. It’s falling down. Should have never, ever been made. I blame Congress. I blame a lot of people for it. But it should have never been made, and we’re going to see what happens on the 12th. 
.... Well, I think that we have very much in common, I must say. I think many things that we — certainly, most things we agreed with, we can change and we can be flexible. You know, in life you have to be flexible. And as leaders of countries, you have to show flexibility. And I think we actually get along on many of the subjects we discussed today.

During the Obama administration, I would often argue that if we wanted to strengthen the hand of President Hassan Rouhani and the more pragmatic constituency in the Iranian elite struggles, we should demonstrate that what Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Qods forces, was doing in the region is costing Iran economically and politically. Unfortunately, today Soleimani, who was a shadowy figure in the past, parades around the region and appears highly successful as Iran shores up Assad, extends its presence in Syria and Iraq with the use of Shia militias, and provides missiles and Hezbollah advisors to the Houthis in Yemen. The Trump administration should be focused on a strategy for countering this Iranian behavior: showing this will cost the Islamic Republic, and proving that it will isolate itself and prevent any normalization with the international community. Which brings us to this irony: The focus on the JCPOA -- whatever its genuine limitations -- won't deal with any of the current Iran threats, including the very real danger that Iran is positioning itself with the Shia militias to fill the vacuum after the defeat of ISIS in Raqqa. At the very moment we need to convince our European allies to join us in raising the costs to the Iranians, the Trump administration would surely alienate them if it appears to walk away from the JCPOA. We certainly won't have more credibility in putting a spotlight on what Iran is doing with Hezbollah and the other Shia militias if we appear to be denying or contradicting the IAEA's findings on Iranian compliance on their nuclear program. Rather than making it easier for our allies to join us, we will make it harder. DennisRoss September 2017

Il problema degli europei è che temono i ricatti degli iraniani piuttosto che le minacce del presidente americano.
Se si riesce a fare in modo che Trump non esca dal JCPOA, la blindatura costituita dalle sanzioni può risultare efficace nel contenere il pericolo costituito dall'Iran che nasce in medio-oriente ma i cui effetti sono ravvisabili su scala globale.
Si tratta di questioni che devono preoccupare anche l'Italia.
Tenuti in considerazione l'isolamento diplomatico di Israele e gli interessi imposti evidentemente da una lobby che non rappresenta l'interesse nazionale italiano nel suo complesso, piuttosto che puntare all'incontro tra delegazioni di governo che sarebbe in programma nei prossimi giorni a Roma, ad Israele conviene interloquire con enti e soggetti interessati a bloccare le sanzioni, usando linguaggio e mezzi convincenti.