Maths in blood

Every day MI5’s people take thousands of decisions based on their assessment of risk and the probability of threat materialising: Is this piece of information credible? How worrying is it really? Is it a departure from what we would normally expect? What do we know as fact? What do we assess to be likely, and how likely is it? What are the chances we have found everything we need to? What other information could we usefully gather to ensure nothing material has been missed? Are these steps proportionate to the risk we think we might be facing? What is the impact of acting in this case? And what is the impact of not acting? Ken McCallum 30 June

24.132 It is entirely understandable that the Security Service viewed some returnees from Syria as a greater threat to national security than equivalent returnees from Libya at that time. However, the focus on Syria meant that both the Security Service and CTPNW underestimated the risk from Libya in 2017. 24.133 To have ‘run the intelligence machine’ to investigate every person returning from Libya would have been impractical at that time, according to the Security Service witnesses, because there were legitimate reasons to visit Libya. It was necessary, for practical reasons as well as other reasons, for there to be some particular indicators that would cause the fact of somebody’s return from Libya to be treated with concern by the Security Service. manchester arena enquiry

Comprensibile se si esclude il contesto del ritorno.

A questo serve la tempistica nello scambio con le forze dell'ordine attive sul territorio. A inquadrare al meglio i pezzi d'informazione a disposizione.

I numeri possono dare indicazioni giuste se presi in considerazione con senso pratico.