I racconti del principe dei segreti

This was an issue of an accumulation of information as they began to operate. Bin laden from 1980’s to 1989’s was fully engaged in supporting the Mujahedeen. He was never an operative of CIA and Saudi Intelligence. The Saudi, American and Pakistani officials were always very careful of two things. First, the cooperation we had, could never be blamed on either Saudi Arabia, or America or Pakistan, by the Soviets. So we were very careful that nothing could be proved either in a court of law or in any field of knowledge and used by the Soviets as an excuse against either of us. Therefore, this meant that we would never operate with anybody who could be captured and could confess to be an agent of Americans or Saudis that would give the Soviets a reason to retaliate. There were many attempts by the Soviets to do that. If you look at their record for some of the criminal trials they held for the people they arrested in Afghanistan; the accusations were that they were working for either ISI, Saudi Intelligence or CIA. But they could never prove that and that was an important qualification for all our work. The second qualification was that none of the material that was given to Mujahedeen could be traced back to either Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or United States. Bin Laden came with humanitarian and monetary support for the Mujahedeen. He based himself in Peshawar where there were refugees. I think there were two cities that were hosting the refugees, Quetta and Peshawar, and there were camps of millions of Afghans. There were groups of NGOs that were working from Pakistan, America, Middle East, and Europe and as far as Japan. And that’s where he (OBL) operated. In these camps, he brought to shelter, food, money and he connected with the Mujahideen leaders to give them these kinds of support. He utilized some of the material from his late father’s engineering construction company, to bring it to Pakistan, to help the Mujahideen inside Afghanistan. To build shelters, to take care of housing, schools in areas under Mujahedeen control. But he was never a fighter with the Mujahideen, and there is an interesting interview that he gave to the Mujahedeen publication, “Jihad Magazine”, in which he described the first battle in which he engaged in Afghanistan, near Jalalabad, and just across the border from Pakistan. In an interview to that Magazine he was asked about that engagement. Bin Laden said that he brought material to Mujahedeen to build shelter, during one such occasion he said that he came under attack from Soviet aircraft and tanks and he fainted due to bombing. He said that when he opened his eyes, he saw that all the Soviet military equipment had been destroyed. I think he said that it was an act of God. That was the only military engagement he ever had with Mujahedeen. globalvillagespace

Il resoconto dei rapporti con Bin Laden è un pugno nello stomaco per il pargolo che negli ultimi mesi ha cercato di resuscitarne lo spirito del combattente.
Sua Altezza Turki al Faisal è il punto d'incontro più alto tra diplomazia e intelligence.
Il suo racconto ha blindato la posizione saudita scaricando molte responsabilità sugli americani, che in effetti raramente hanno fatto tesoro dei consigli degli alleati nei momenti chiave, e ha smussato le colpe pachistane. La verità è che c'erano due realtà molto frammentate. L'universo Af-Pak e la galassia saudita fatta di trame di palazzo, faccendieri, filantropi e tanto altro.
Mohammed bin Salman dovrebbe fare affidamento sui consigli di Sua Altezza per risolvere alcune questioni spinose sul fronte estero.